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INTRODUCTION: 
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, SECULARISM AND 
RELIGION BE RECONCILED IN AN ERA OF 
GLOBALIZATION AND RELIGIOUS REVIVAL? 
Michel Rosenfeld* 
I.     THE PARAMETERS OF THE CONTEMPORARY PREDICAMENT 
 
Distilled to its core, modern constitutionalism is the necessary 
byproduct of the Enlightenment and, above all, of the latter’s essential 
grounding in a secular vision.  In a nutshell, the essential tenets that 
animate the Enlightenment project are threefold: the radical separation 
between the realm of Faith and that of Reason; entrusting the ruling of 
the public sphere exclusively to the dictates of the realm of Reason; and 
the promotion of liberty and equality for all.  If to this we add that the 
Enlightenment originally stood against an unraveling feudal order mired 
in clashes between Faith and Reason and in manifold fratricidal wars 
among adherents to rival religions, then the place of religion in the 
secular polity becomes abundantly clear.  Religion should be expelled 
from the public sphere, but consistent will the equal liberty of all, all 
religions with adherents within the polity should enjoy equal protection 
within the private sphere.  Moreover, from a constitutional standpoint, 
the modern state steeped in the normative order dictated by the 
Enlightenment should at once be both neutral with respect to religion, 
by neither favoring it nor disfavoring it within its (public) sphere of 
legitimate action, and also equally protective of its citizens’ freedom of 
and from religion within the private sphere.  This dual constitutional 
prescription is neatly encapsulated in the Religion Clauses found in the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution: The “Establishment 
Clause” prohibits the state from adopting, preferring or endorsing a 
religion, whereas the “Free Exercise Clause” enjoins the state from 
interfering with the religious freedom of its citizens.1  Consistent with 
the Enlightenment’s secularist ideal, there ought to be a “wall of 
 
 *  Justice Sydney L. Robins Professor of Human Rights, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of 
Law. 
 1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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separation” between church and state,2 combined with a complete lack 
of interference by the state with freedom of religion within the private 
sphere.3  In short, ideally, the public sphere should be neither religious 
nor antireligious, but areligious.  The private sphere, on the other hand, 
should preserve peaceful coexistence among all the diverse religious 
ideologies that dwell within its precincts. 
It is obvious that there is a wide gap between Enlightenment ideals 
and how the Enlightenment project has actually fared since its launch in 
the wake of the 1787 United States Constitution and the 1789 French 
Revolution.  To take but one example, equality between men and 
women is clearly prescribed by the Enlightenment ideal, yet women did 
not obtain the right to vote till 1920 in the United States4 and till 1944 in 
France.5  It is, accordingly, hardly surprising that contemporary 
constitutional jurisprudence regarding the relationship between religion 
and the state should deviate in various degrees from the Enlightenment 
ideal outlined above.  The key question for our purposes, however, is 
whether there are any plausible scenarios under which a working 
constitutional jurisprudence may reasonably approximate that 
Enlightenment ideal. 
At present, the prospects of such an approximation seem rather 
dim, and if anything, significantly less likely than they might have been 
a generation ago.  Indeed, there has been both an intensification of 
religion through the spread of “strong” religion6 and the deployment of 
several different fundamentalist religions, ranging from Protestant 
fundamentalism in United States7 to Islamic fundamentalism with a 
 
 2 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
 3 The actual meaning and implication of the U.S. Religion Clauses have been subject to 
much controversy and debate throughout the past two centuries.  See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The 
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 673 
(1980) (discussing the many problems posed in the quest for a proper balance between the two 
Religion Clauses); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the 
Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323 (discussing numerous shifts in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the Religion Clauses).  My aim here, however, is not to account for 
American constitutional jurisprudence as it pertains to the Religion Clauses, but rather to consider 
the latter in the light of the Enlightenment’s secularist ideal. 
 4 See U.S. CONST. amend XIX. 
 5 See Ordinance of the French Provisional Government, Assembleé Nationale, “La 
citoyenneté politique des Femmes,” of Apr. 21, 1944, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Apr. 22, 1944,  available at http://www.assemblee.nationale 
.fr/historie/femmes/citoyennete_politique_de-Gaulle.asp.  Some feminists have argued that the 
Enlightenment even in theory promotes a fraternity among men, which excludes women from 
power, thus making genuine equality for women structurally impossible.  See generally CAROLE 
PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988).  The issues raised by this feminist claim remain 
beyond the scope of this Introduction. 
 6 See András Sajó, Constitutionalism and Secularism: The Need for Public Reason, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2401 (2009). 
 7 See JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 3 (1994). 
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global aspirations.8  Moreover, since the 1980’s, there has been a 
“deprivatization” of religion9 that involves two interrelated processes: 
the “repoliticization of the private religious and moral sphere”; and the 
“renormativization of the public economic and political spheres.”10 
Concurrently with this religious revival, there has been, on the 
philosophical plane, a radical post-modern attack on one of the 
Enlightenment’s key tenets, namely the clear separation between the 
realm of Reason and that of Faith.11  Briefly stated, the post-modern 
challenge builds on the “disenchantment of reason” associated with the 
perception that Reason as the means to the implantation of a universally 
justified rational order gives way to purely instrumental reason—i.e., a 
use of reason and of scientific methodology for purposes of advancing 
the narrow interests of the powerful, fostering colonialism and neo-
colonialism, exacerbating disparities in wealth, etc.12  The reduction of 
reason to instrumental reason turns the means of the Enlightenment 
against its ends, and particularly against the pursuit of liberty and 
equality for all. 
As the spread of instrumental reason tends to become all pervasive, 
alienated social actors are prone to retreating to individualist isolation in 
futile opposition to an increasingly oppressive and meaningless social 
reality.13  From the standpoint of conceptions of the good and of their 
pursuit, modernism anchored in Reason and Enlightenment values gives 
way progressively to a fragmentation of competing post-modern visions 
fueled by the subjectivism engendered by disenchanted individualist 
isolation.14  In this postmodern setting, all competing discourses and all 
competing conceptions of the good emerge as ultimately purely 
subjective and as equivalent, thus negating any priority or particular 
legitimacy to secularism, modernism, reason or Enlightenment values.15 
 
 8 See Michel Rosenfeld, Derrida’s Ethical Turn and America: Looking Back from the 
Crossroads of Global Terrorism and the Enlightenment, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 815, 829 (2005) 
(discussing the link between global terror and Al Qaeda’s brand of Islamic fundamentalism). 
 9 See CASANOVA, supra note 7, at 3 (“Religion in the 1980’s went public . . . . leaving its 
assigned place in the private sphere [and thrusting] itself into the public arena of moral and 
political contestation. . . . [Among the developments responsible for this change] were the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran; the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland; the role of 
Catholicism . . . in . . . political conflicts throughout Latin America; and the public reemergence 
of Protestant fundamentalism as a force in American politics.”). 
 10 Id. at 5-6. 
 11 See Michel Rosenfeld, A Pluralist Critique of the Constitutional Treatment of Religion, in 
THE LAW OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY: MODELS FOR POST-COMMUNISM 39, 40 (András Sajó & 
Sholomo Avineri eds., 1999). 
 12 See generally Jürgen Habermas, Conceptions of Modernity: A Look Back at Two 
Traditions, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE POSTNATIONAL CONSTELLATION: POLITICAL ESSAYS 
130, 138-40 (Max Pensky ed. & trans., Polity 2001) (1998). 
 13 Id. at 140. 
 14 See Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation and the Future of Democracy, in 
HABERMAS, supra note 12, at 58, 88. 
 15 The conception of post-modernism implied by these remarks is consistent with Habermas’s 
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Modernism and pursuit of the Enlightenment project not only 
displace religion by confining it to the private sphere, but they also 
relativize it.  They relativize it, moreover, in two different respects.  
First, they force the religious to act consistent with the dictates of 
Reason and the Enlightenment to the extent that they must partake in 
life within the public sphere.  And second, in the inevitable 
confrontation between the faith practiced at home and reason as 
imposed in the public square—and as the consequence of being 
constantly reminded that officially all religions are equivalent—it 
becomes highly likely that even in foro interno one’s religion will 
become less all-encompassing and less prone to leading to assertions of 
absolute truth as against all believers as well as all non-believers.16 
Viewed in light of the “disenchantment of reason” and of the 
consequent retreat of modernism, post-modern subjectivism and the 
revival of religion, including the spread of religious fundamentalism,17 
loom as two sides of the same coin as they seek to fill the void left by 
the retreat of Reason.  Religion, accordingly, becomes “de-relativized” 
at the same time that it becomes “deprivatized,” and as a corollary, 
secularism falls off its modernist pedestal and becomes yet one more 
religion or purely subjective post-modern ideology.  Or more precisely, 
as Reason loses its modernist grip, religion (moved from within) finds 
more room to project its truth as absolute and exclusive, while 
secularism viewed from the outside becomes more susceptible to being 
cast as yet one more (false) religion.  This, moreover, transforms the 
conflict between Faith and Reason into a conflict among competing 
Faiths—a transformation that has proven to be of more than purely 
theoretical interest.  For example, in the 1980’s, Protestant 
fundamentalist parents brought cases before the U.S. federal courts, in 
 
views on the matter, but there are many different, often contradictory, conceptions of post-
modernism.  For example, Jacques Derrida, one of the foremost post-modern philosophers, has 
insisted that post-modernism is consistent with pursuit of the Enlightenment project.  For a 
discussion of the contrast between Derrida’s and Habermas’s understanding of the historical 
deployment of the Enlightenment project, see Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 826-31, 836-37. 
 16 Cf. Jürgen Habermas, Reconstructing Terrorism, in PHILOSOPHY IN A TIME OF TERROR: 
DIALOGUES WITH JÜRGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA, 45, 70, 72, 78 (Giovanna 
Borradori ed., 2003).  What distinguishes fundamentalist religion viewed as a violent reaction 
against modernism from modern religion is not the content of belief but its modality.  Religious 
fundamentalists regard the truths of their own religion as absolute, leaving no room for science or 
other religions.  Id. 
 17 A distinction must be drawn, for present purposes, between religious fundamentalism as a 
religious matter and as a politico-constitutional matter.  From a purely religious standpoint, a 
“fundamentalist” is someone who takes holy texts literally; from a politico-constitutional 
standpoint, in contrast, a “religious fundamentalist” is one who considers his or her religion as the 
exclusive and absolute truth and who insists that the state be ruled pursuant to the dictates of the 
true religion.  Thus, mullahs in Iran and certain ultra-Orthodox rabbis in Israel who believe that 
the state should be ruled in strict conformity with religious precepts and laws may nonetheless not 
endorse literal interpretations of the Koran or of the Torah respectively.  Unless otherwise 
specified, “pluralism” will be used here in its politico-constitutional meaning. 
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which they sought condemnation of the curriculum of the public schools 
attended by their children as unconstitutionally imposing the “religion” 
of “secular humanism” in violation of the Establishment Clause.18  The 
courts rejected the claim that the teaching of “secular humanism” 
violates the Establishment Clause,19 but in so doing did little to debunk 
the logic of the complaining parents. 
To the extent that fundamentalists regard their religion as the 
absolute truth and as establishing a comprehensive vision that accounts 
for everything under the sun (and beyond) to the last detail, then any 
utterance that does not accord with their religious truth can be 
characterized plausibly as issuing from another (false) religion.  A mere 
statement in a literary text read during English class to the effect that 
“nature is powerful and beautiful in its mysterious ways” which would 
strike an average contemporary reader as innocuous and devoid of 
significant religious connation would hence be doubly offensive to 
fundamentalist parents like those who brought suit.  First, the statement 
in question is contrary to these parents’ religion, which asserts that 
nature can in no way be considered as being independent from the will 
of God.  And, second, that in forcing these parents’ children to read this 
statement (and others like it) the school is spreading false religion—or 
subjective ideology, to use the language of post-modernism—that 
denies the existence of God or at least his omnipresence and 
omnipotence.20 
As mentioned above, the federal courts that refused to treat 
“secular humanism” as a religion for purposes of the Establishment 
Clause did not really address the plaintiff’s arguments directly, and it is 
now evident why.  The plaintiff’s arguments were both fundamentalist 
(concerning secularism—which they characterized as “secular 
humanism” to stress that they considered it a false religion that deifies 
humans rather than venerating God).  In contrast, the only plausible 
justification for the courts’ decisions is a modernist one that adheres to 
the separation between Faith and Reason and that considers secularism 
as different in kind from religion. 
This conflict between the visions of fundamentalist Protestants and 
U.S. federal judges in the 1980’s may seem arcane and no more than an 
isolated instance, pitting a handful of religious fanatics against the 
secular establishment committed to Reason, constitutionalism  and 
religious freedom for all.  Upon closer scrutiny, and particularly when 
 
 18 See Smith v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); Grove v. Mead Sch. 
Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 19 Id. 
 20 Similar reasoning is involved in efforts to prohibit the teaching of evolution in public 
schools or to combine its teaching with the teaching of creationism.  See Guy Haarscher, 
Religious Revival and Pseudo-Secularism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2799 (2009). 
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projected into its own future, however, the conflict in question looms as 
emblematic of the current predicament.  Today, religious revival, 
fundamentalism and post-modern subjectivism seem ever more present 
than they did in the 1980’s, while at the same time there are intensified 
efforts to buttress and reinforce secularism.21  Accordingly, whether 
constitutionalism, secularism and religion can be reconciled within 
present-day polities depends to a large extent on whether the conflict 
between the modern and the post-modern (including “deprivatized” 
and”derelativized” religion) can be successfully handled and managed 
even if it cannot be fully resolved. 
All the contributions to this Symposium address and shed light on 
this crucial issue, or on some key aspect of it from a large number of 
different perspectives, traditions, constitutional backgrounds, disciplines 
and parts of the world.  To better situate and be in an optimal position to 
evaluate these contributions and their import, it is necessary to inquire 
further into the relevant conceptual and historical circumstances that 
have led to the current predicament and that circumscribe the nature and 
scope of plausible solutions to the daunting challenges that it poses.  
With this in mind, I will briefly focus on the conditions that would 
optimize the treatment of religion according to the values and aims of 
the Enlightenment.  This will hopefully provide a useful baseline for 
discussion and evaluation (II).  Next, I will provide a summary 
comparative overview of the principal different ways in which the 
constitutional relationship between the state and religion has actually 
been handled, placing each of these in their relevant historical and 
conceptual context (III).  Finally, I will sketch a rough outline of the 
range of possible solutions to the dilemmas raised by the current 
predicament.  In doing so, I will inquire into whether contemporary 
ideological, cultural, social, political and constitutional realities make it 
impossible or undesirable to continue the pursuit of the Enlightenment 
project (IV). 
 
II.     THE IDEAL CONDITIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF 
SECULARISM AND RELIGION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
PROJECT 
 
As will be discussed in (III) below, none of the types of 
constitutional treatment of religion actually in force in contemporary 
democratic polities fully conforms to the dictates of the Enlightenment.  
Given the number and variety of experiences involved, it seems most 
 
 21 See, e.g., Patrick Weil, Why the French Laïcité Is Liberal, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2699 
(2009) (discussing recent legal initiatives to reinforce secularism (laïcité) in French public 
institutions). 
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unlikely that any entirely successful alternative is looming over the 
horizon.  It seems useful, accordingly, to inquire into the ideal 
conditions that would be best suited to allow for the optimal relationship 
between secularism and religion, consistent with full realization of the 
objects set by the Enlightenment project.  Once identified, these ideal 
conditions should provide a workable counterfactual22 yielding a 
baseline against which to assess existing arrangements and furnishing 
adequate criteria for determining whether existing models of 
constitutional regulation might be perfectible or whether the 
Enlightenment project is ultimately doomed to failure (at least as it 
pertains to its handling of religion). 
In light of the essential tenets of the Enlightenment described 
above23 and of the implications of the latter with respect to religion,24 
establishing the ideal conditions for optimal constitutional 
accommodation of secularism and religion would depend above all on 
achieving the following essentials.  First, it is imperative to set a clear 
and workable divide between Faith and Reason.  Second, it is necessary 
to elaborate a conception of secularism that is truly areligious and that 
neither favors nor disadvantages any religion or the non-religious.  
Third, a way must be found to institute a public sphere that is clearly 
and firmly delimited from the private sphere and that is entirely 
amenable to the rule of areligious secularism.  And fourth, the private 
sphere must be populated by religions and non-religious ideologies that 
are susceptible of being veritably treated equally—i.e., of benefiting of 
substantive as opposed to merely formal equal treatment25—and that are 
amenable to confining their expression and activities within the 
precincts of the private sphere. 
Notwithstanding the attacks, alluded to above, launched by post-
modernism and by revival religion,26 the first of the four essentials 
clearly seems the easiest to achieve in theory and to set in motion as a 
fruitful counterfactual.  This can be done by drawing the line between 
that which is amenable to the methods used in scientific inquiry or is 
 
 22 A counterfactual is a constructed model that is contrary-to-fact but bears sufficient 
connections to relevant factual orderings to furnish workable criteria of perfectibility or 
appropriate standards for purposes of critique.  See MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST 
INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS AND POLITICS 124 (1998) (“[C]ounterfactual 
construct of a pristine market economy with evenly matched competitors, perfect information, 
and no transaction costs can be useful either to critique existing markets as self-legitimating 
procedural mechanisms or to vindicate such real-life markets because of their greater proximity to 
their counterfactual counterparts than any plausible alternative.”). 
 23 See supra pp. 2333-34. 
 24 See supra pp. 2335-36. 
 25 For example, in a polity comprised of Christians, Jews and Muslims, a legal prohibition of 
male circumcision would treat all three religions equally from a formal, but not from a 
substantive, standpoint.  This is because whereas Judaism and Islam prescribe male circumcision, 
Christianity does not. 
 26 See supra pp. 2335-36. 
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susceptible of empirical or rational verification, on the one hand, and 
that which is not, such as religious beliefs or metaphysical convictions, 
on the other.  At a counterfactual level at least, this line can be 
consistently and systematically maintained, making it conceivable to 
institutionally impose exclusive reliance on Reason to the exclusion of 
Faith in the public sphere.27  Thus, for example, a claim that greater 
irrigation would yield better crops that is susceptible of empirical 
verification, would be admissible in the public sphere, but not a claim 
that recital of a particular prayers should be mandated to avert a 
drought.  Similarly, as Guy Haarscher indicates in his contribution to 
this Symposium, “creationism” and “intelligent design,” which some 
wish to have taught in U.S. public schools alongside the theory of 
evolution, unlike the latter are not susceptible to validation or 
falsification pursuant to scientifically acceptable standards.28 
That the divide between Faith and Reason considered here can 
function successfully at the counterfactual level does not imply that it 
could do so under actual historical circumstances, or even that it would 
be desirable to adhere to it systematically in practice.  Moreover, strict 
adherence to this divide would not only exclude religion and religious 
claims from the public sphere, but also morals and moral claims and 
even arguably politics and (certain) political claims. 
Take, for instance, Kant’s famous moral claim that we ought to 
treat all fellow humans as ends and not as means.  This claim is 
certainly not susceptible to empirical or scientific validation or 
falsification.  Ought it therefore be excluded, consistent with the 
counterfactual under consideration, from the public sphere?  Arguably 
yes, inasmuch as moral claims are akin to religious claims from the 
standpoint of the strictly confined definition of Reason within the 
counterfactual in question. 
One may object that Kantian morality (and Kant himself) appeal to 
public reason, i.e., to “reasons accessible to all, irrespective of their 
religious belief,”29 and Kantian morality is therefore clearing within the 
realm of Reason as conceived by the foremost philosopher of the 
Enlightenment.  This is an undeniable historical fact, but one can still 
defend the narrower conception of reason carved out consistent with our 
counterfactual as being better suited for purposes of constructing ideal 
conditions.  Indeed, whereas Kantian morality does not depend on any 
religious belief in a transcendent deity, it is nonetheless not empirically 
 
 27 The divide contemplated here is akin to the one relating to the Rawlsian concept of “public 
reason” discussed in this symposium in the contributions by Kent Greenawalt, Secularism, 
Religion, and Liberal Democracy in the United States, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2383 (2009), and 
Sajó, supra note 6. 
 28 See Haarscher, supra note 20, at 2817. 
 29 Sajó, supra note 6, at 2401 (citing to Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: “What is 
Enlightenment?,” in POLITICAL WRITINGS 54, 55 (Hans Reiss ed., 1991)). 
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or scientifically veritable, or even susceptible to being proved 
normatively valid through an exclusive appeal to reason.  As a matter of 
fact, one can plausibly accuse Kantian morality of being ultimately but 
an expression of the “religion” of “secular humanism.”  Not only are the 
claims made by Kantian morality beyond any factual verification, but 
also, unlike the propositions of logic, they need not be accepted as valid 
by anyone who makes proper use of his or her rational capabilities.  
Thus, it seems no less rational to embrace a utilitarian brand of morality 
that would prescribe using persons as means to the extent that this 
would promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number than to 
strictly adhere to Kantian morality. 
The reason that Kantian morality can be characterized plausibly as 
a manifestation of the “religion” of “secular humanism” is because it is 
ultimately grounded on an act of faith.  To illustrate this, suppose a 
confrontation between a proponent of Kantian morals and a religion that 
stipulates that all humans are but means for God’s great design for the 
future of the universe and that, accordingly, they must follow a strict 
religious morality consisting exclusively of fulfilling duties towards 
God without being entitled to any rights as against God or humans.  
Suppose further that the believer asks the Kantian on what grounds she 
considers her morals superior, and that she replies that she does so 
because her morals appeal to public reason and not to faith.  At that 
point, the believer could reply that the Kantian’s exclusive focus on 
humans and appeal to public reason necessarily imply a rejection of the 
existence of God or denial of his relevance to, or interest in, matters of 
human morality, and that all of these inevitably involve assumptions 
based on faith of certain propositions that are as impossible to prove as 
is the existence of God.  Moreover, the believer could also plausibly 
insist that this last argument appeals to public reason just as much as 
arguments deriving from Kantian morals.  Indeed, the believer’s 
argument boils down to the claim that reason can neither prove nor 
disprove the existence of God, nor determine whether God does, or 
ought to, prescribe a true morality for humans.  Accordingly, asserting 
or denying that God has a role in human morality are both ultimately 
dependent on an act of faith. 
It should be clear now why the counterfactual elaborated in the 
search for ideal conditions should confine itself to a narrow definition of 
the realm of Reason that excludes some claims that would be acceptable 
under a Kantian or Rawlsian conception of public reason.  Under the 
narrow definition in question, the realm of Reason would be confined to 
empirically or scientifically verifiable or falsifiable claims, as well as to 
those claims to public reason that would or should be accepted by 
everyone, provided they firmly engaged in the proper exercise of their 
rational capacities.  By drawing the line narrowly, the counterfactual 
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protects against endless discussion and blurring and against the constant 
danger of unleashing interminable slippery slopes.30 
As indicated above, the ban from the counterfactual realm of 
Reason should extend not only to morals but also to some politics and to 
some political claims.  More specifically, to the extent that the realm of 
politics encompasses both the setting of ends for the life of the polity 
and of means to such ends, the counterfactual should exclude from the 
realm of Reason all claims pertaining to political ends and those claims 
pertaining to political means that may not ever be susceptible to 
validation of falsification by science, experience or reason.  The 
political ends of a society may have religious or secular origins, but in 
either case they ultimately depend on an act of faith in the same sense 
that morals do.  Whether the goal of politics in a particular polity be the 
establishment of a common life pursuant to the dictates of a given 
religion, the pursuit of the maximization of wealth, the promotion of a 
common culture, the fostering of harmony and solidarity among the 
citizenry, etc., the necessary justification involved is dependent on 
normative claims that are ultimately grounded in some act of faith—just 
as are religious beliefs and Kantian or utilitarian morality.  Hence, the 
exclusion of the politics of ends is justified in the same fashion as that 
of morals in the delimitation of the appropriate counterfactual realm of 
Reason. 
The politics of means, in contrast, are in most cases amenable to 
standards of verification and falsification, at least as most broadly 
understood.  If we agree that the paramount goal for the polity is the 
maximization of wealth, we can certainly subject competing policy 
means offered in pursuit of that goal to accepted standards of validation 
and falsification.  Moreover, that a particular policy means cannot be at 
present validated or falsified should not pose a problem so long as it 
remains in principle subject to eventual validation or falsification.  For 
example, it may be at some point uncertain whether a more liberal or a 
more conservative fiscal policy would better serve the goal of 
maximizing wealth.  Nevertheless, the question concerning which of 
these two fiscal policies is better suited to advance the policy goal in 
question can be submitted to accepted standards of validation and 
falsification, and nothing precludes that one day it will be answered 
definitively in conformity with these standards.  Accordingly, all 
 
 30 This counterfactual achievement does not imply, of course, anything similar at the factual 
level.  Moreover, whereas the believer can certainly deny the validity or relevance of science just 
as he can deny the validity of the categorical imperative in the case of Kantian morals, there is a 
crucial difference between the realm of science and that of morals.  What counts as science—as 
opposed to its relevance, utility or desirability—can be systematically determined in accordance 
with a set of established standards open to all.  Because of this, to determine whether an assertion 
does belong to the realm of science (or empirical observation or logic) does not involve any act of 
faith in the sense that any assertion to validity in morals does. 
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politics of means in principle susceptible of validation or falsification in 
relation to their potential for advancing the ends towards which they are 
directed should be included within the counterfactual realm of Reason 
erected in the pursuit of ideal conditions. 
Defining the contours of the second among four essentials, namely 
a version of secularism that is areligious and that neither favors nor 
disfavors any religion or the non-religious, looms as a much more 
daunting task than the one just completed regarding the first essential.  
One may be tempted to tailor the counterfactual definition of secularism 
to the counterfactual delimitation of the divide between Faith and 
Reason articulated above.  That, however, would not be satisfactory 
because whereas the epistemological distinction between what falls 
within the purview of science and what does not is unexceptionable, it 
does not follow that a secularism tailored to fit that divide would 
necessarily qualify as areligious.  Indeed, acting in the public sphere in 
conformity with science may readily qualify as anti-religious from the 
standpoint of at least some religions.  For example, state mandated 
vaccination of the entire population to prevent a deadly epidemic would 
be justified pursuant to universally accepted standards of contemporary 
medical science and yet at the same time counter a particular religion’s 
prescription of any medical intervention as being against the will of 
God.  The latter religion need not question the effectiveness of the 
vaccine as that may be irrelevant in terms of the belief in the divine 
proscription to which it feels compelled to adhere.  Similarly, if the state 
mandates the teaching of evolution theory in its public schools while 
prohibiting the teaching of creationism or intelligent design in science 
courses, it would adhere to the counterfactual divide between Reason 
and Faith but would be subject to condemnation as anti-religious from 
the perspective of those religions whose truths are incompatible with the 
claims of evolution theory.  They would only have to claim that having 
science rather than (their) religion rule the public sphere is normatively 
unwarranted, thus backing their conclusion that any version of 
secularism that calls for the teaching of evolution theory in public 
schools in anti-religious. 
It seems, in view of the preceding observations, that no plausible 
conception of secularism can be cogently cast as inherently areligious, 
even as a purely counterfactual matter.  This does not mean that the 
second essential must be dropped, but it does require that it be 
coordinated in a relational manner with the third and fourth essentials.  
Indeed, for secularism to be able to count as being areligious it need not 
avoid conflict with all religions, but only with those with a presence 
within the relevant polity.  Thus, if a universal state mandated 
vaccination policy is introduced in a polity only comprised of religions 
that would all approve of such policy as life-saving or life-enhancing, 
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then such policy would qualify as areligious within the context of that 
polity.  Under such circumstances, no one within the latter polity would 
object to the vaccination policy on either religious or anti-religious 
grounds.  Similarly, if the public sphere within the polity in question 
were reserved exclusively for the promotion of public health and the 
promotion of other political ends equally shared by all existing religious 
and non-religious ideologies with adherents within that polity, then all 
political means adopted to further the commonly accepted political ends 
would comport with a viable counterfactual conception of areligious 
secularism. Thus, for example, if all religions and non-religious 
ideologies within a polity concurred on the desirability of the goal of 
maximizing wealth—even if for different reasons as in the case in 
which some of the non-religious consider pursuit of that goal an end in 
itself whereas their religious counterparts deem it a desirable means for 
purposes of retribution through charity—then using the public sphere as 
the locus for selection and implementation of policies designed to 
promote the maximization of wealth would comport with the 
implantation of areligious secularism. 
The characteristics of the third essential, a public sphere clearly 
distinguishable from the private sphere and amenable to exclusive rule 
under the precepts of areligious secularism, readily emerge in light of 
the previous discussion.  From a counterfactual perspective oriented 
toward postulating ideal conditions, the divide between the public and 
the private sphere should track the counterfactual divide between 
Reason and Faith that informs the first essential.  The public sphere, 
accordingly, should be exclusively confined to what may be 
encompassed within the realm of Reason. The private sphere, on the 
other hand, should be conceived of as being simultaneously amenable to 
functioning according to the strictures of the realm of Faith as well as 
according to the requirements of the realm of Reason.  This should 
make for conditions conducive to peaceful coexistence among adherents 
to different religions, proponents of different post-modern ideologies, 
and defenders of modernism and of the Enlightenment project.  
Moreover, the exclusivity of the realm of Reason within the public 
sphere would be indispensable for two separate reasons: First, for 
maintaining a clear and cogent boundary between what ought to be 
public and what to be private; and second, to reserve sufficient space for 
the possible operation of some viable version of areligious secularism. 
Since even under the best of circumstances, there would seem to be 
relatively little chance that adherents to all different ideologies within a 
given polity would agree to characterize its public sphere as areligious 
(or to treat it as amounting to something areligious, as would be the case 
where the religious consider the public sphere in question to be in 
conformity with their religion, and the anti-religious with their own 
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outlook), the ideal counterfactual public sphere should be as reduced in 
scope as possible and directed mainly, if not exclusively, towards 
politics of means and toward policies designed to further the 
achievement of political ends over which there is a general consensus. 
The fourth essential is that religions and non-religious ideologies 
being relegated to the private sphere be susceptible of substantive equal 
treatment within the confines of that sphere.  For this to be possible 
even counterfactually, it is necessary that no religion involved claim an 
entitlement in accordance with its own religious norms to priority or 
exclusivity with respect to other religions or non-religious ideologies 
within the polity, or to a stake in that polity’s public sphere.  Whether a 
particular polity could come close to meeting these counterfactual 
requirements would depend of course on its actual mix of religions and 
non-religious ideologies.  Fundamentalist religions would obviously 
squarely negate any possibility of coming close to achieving the 
counterfactual requirements in question, as would any religion that 
requires intervention into the public sphere.31 
The preceding discussion of the four essentials provides a fair idea 
of the counterfactual best suited to the ideal conditions for constitutional 
accommodation of secularism and religion within the ambit of the 
Enlightenment project.  Before shifting from the counterfactual to the 
actual historical record concerning the relationship between secularism 
and religion, two further points warrant brief mention.  The first of these 
is that certain political ideologies are better suited than others for 
purposes of approximating the counterfactual; the second, as already 
alluded to above, that some religions and some types of religion are 
more suited than others with the same purposes in mind. 
The three principal political ideologies that are consistent with 
contemporary constitutional democracy and the ideals of the 
Enlightenment are liberalism, republicanism and communitarianism.32  
Liberalism is individualistic in outlook and conceives the political 
sphere chiefly as the proper locus for securing what each individual 
needs in terms of autonomy and welfare in order to allow that individual 
to pursue self-realization and self-fulfillment according to that 
individual’s (religious or secular) conception of the good.  There are 
several versions of liberalism ranging from the libertarian one espoused 
by Locke and Nozick to the egalitarian one articulated by Rawls.  Of 
these, the libertarian vision has the narrowest conception of the public 
 
 31 Cf. Andrew F. March, Are Secularism and Neutrality Attractive to Religious Minorities?  
Islamic Discussions of Western Secularism in the “Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities” (fiqh al-
aqalliyyat) Discourse, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821, 2828 (2009) (characterizing Islam as the 
religion with the most “unequivocal claim to a public, political vision” and as rejecting 
secularism explicitly). 
 32 For a comparison of these three ideologies from a pluralist perspective, see ROSENFELD, 
supra note 22, at 217-24. The following brief account draws on that comparison. 
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sphere in the conviction that the individual is best off and able to 
achieve her ends while enjoying adequate autonomy and welfare under 
a minimal “night watchman” state confined to upholding formal rights, 
affording protection to personal security and to private property in a 
laissez-faire market economy.33 
Republicanism centers on civic virtue and on promoting freedom 
through self-government.  Pursuant to Rousseau’s republican vision, 
each individual as citizen has a duty to join all fellow citizens to govern 
together in accordance with the prescriptions of the “general will.”  
Republicanism requires constant intervention in the public sphere as it 
places self-determination through setting political ends (in conformity 
with the general will) and devising the means to achieve them at the top 
of its hierarchy of values.  Republicanism’s heavy emphasis on using 
the public sphere to set common political goals make it less likely than 
liberalism to conform to the exigencies of the counterfactual elaborated 
above or to lead to any close approximation of areligious secularism. 
Communitarianism, for its part, assigns overriding status to 
solidarity and group loyalty. Communitarianism promotes collective 
self-realization and collective self-fulfillment in relation to commonly 
shared normative commitments and values.  Communitarianism can be 
monistic, positing the entire polity as a single undivided community.  Or 
it can be pluralistic, conceiving of the polity as a whole as a community 
comprised of several smaller sub-national communities linked through 
sufficient bonds of integration into the community of the whole.  Many 
religions, particularly if they seamlessly integrate the relationships 
between the believer and the divinity with those (political, familial, 
social, etc.) among believers, as Islam and Judaism clearly do,34 can be 
cast profitably in communal terms.  If a religion dominates the 
community of the whole, then secularism becomes altogether 
impossible. Religious communities, however, can also constitute 
smaller communities within the larger one, with the community of the 
whole remaining secular.  In the latter case, because of the importance 
under communitarianism of setting common goals and of acting 
together to achieve them, the community of the whole would have to be 
heavily invested in designing political, social and cultural objectives as 
well as in overseeing their implementation.  Under these circumstances, 
it is difficult to imagine how the community of the whole could come 
close to satisfying the requirements of areligious secularism.  For this 
reason, if not others, communitarianism, like republicanism, seems less 
suited than liberalism for the task of approximating a religious 
 
 33 See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26-27 (1974). 
 34 See March, supra note 31, at 2828 (describing the communal nature of Islam); and Gidi 
Sapir & Daniel Statman, Religious Marriage in a Liberal State, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2855, 
2868-71 (2009) (communal aspects of Judaism). 
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secularism in particular, as well as the counterfactual conditions 
identified above.35 
The second point mentioned above, namely that some religions 
seem more inherently compatible with areligious secularism than others, 
was already briefly addressed.  Limited further elaboration is warranted, 
however, to allow for a better grasp of the implications of certain salient 
differences among various religions.  Religions may run the gamut 
from, on one end, confinement to contemplation, meditation, and 
strictly personal one-to-one prayer or communication addressed to the 
divinity, to, on the other end, all encompassing religious rule, in 
accordance with a full set of religious laws, down to the most minute 
detail of the personal, social and political life of each believer and of the 
community of believers (and, in the case of an aggressively 
proselytizing religion, of each and everyone throughout the entire 
polity).  Merely contemplative religion is obviously compatible with 
areligious secularism whereas aggressively proselytizing one is 
definitely not.  Moreover, beyond these extremes, certain combinations 
of religions within a polity may be more amenable to approximation of 
religious secularism than others.  Furthermore, of the three major 
Western religions, as pointed out in several contributions to this 
Symposium, Christianity seems much better suited to secularism than 
Islam or Judaism.  This is due, in important part, to Christianity’s 
commitment to the separation between the realm of God and that of 
Cesar as opposed to Islam’s and Judaism’s all encompassing approaches 
requiring that religious rule extend over both the public and the political 
sphere.  Because of this key difference, the counterfactual construct 
pointing to ideal conditions would be better off embracing Christianity 
rather than its two major Western counterparts in order to yield the best 
possible approximation of areligious secularism. But that would create a 
paradox.  If the pursuit of areligious secularism leads to a preference for 
Christianity, would that not undermine the whole project by lifting 
Christianity above Islam and Judaism? 
Based on the preceding analysis, the counterfactual constructed to 
 
 35 One variant that may seem appealing at first would be the combining of liberalism at the 
level of the polity as a whole with communitarianism of smaller groups such as religious 
communities and other such communal groupings within the polity.  Under further consideration, 
such alternative presents several drawbacks.  If the smaller communities become virtually 
completely self-ruling, then minorities and dissidents within them are in danger of loosing their 
fundamental rights, including their freedom of religion rights.  See, e.g., Sapir & Statman, supra 
note 34, at 2868-71 (describing how the Orthodox rabbinate in Israel, with exclusive jurisdiction 
over marriage in Israel’s Jewish community, curtail the right to marry of many non-believing 
Jews and of Jews belonging to the more liberal wings of Judaism).  On the other hand, if the 
secular community of the whole limits the self-rule of smaller groups to safeguard the 
fundamental rights of their members, then the disruptions of communal life within religious 
communities would inevitably render the secularism of the community of the whole anti-
religious. 
 2348 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 30:6 
account for the ideal conditions for an optional constitutional 
accommodation of secularism and religion within the ambit of the 
Enlightenment project does not provide a pristine model that many 
would be eager to emulate.  On the one hand, this counterfactual 
contains features that are undesirable or impossible to approximate.  It 
provides a sharp and sustainable divide between Reason and Faith, but 
the idea that Kantian morals should be barred from the public sphere for 
the same reason as fundamentalist religion seems highly unattractive.  
The counterfactual also calls for a liberal minimum night watchman 
state which would be both objectionable from a large number of 
perspectives and impossible to reasonably approximate under current 
conditions.  On the other hand, even at the counterfactual level, the 
model in question is remarkably tenuous.  It provides a conception of 
areligious secularism that cannot stand on its own, but is dependent on a 
fortuitous combination of religious and nonreligious ideologies being 
present in the relevant polity.  And if that were to happen, it would turn 
out to be purely contingent.  Accordingly, instead of shaping the 
counterfactual universe in which it is designed to operate, areligious 
secularism looms as entirely dependent on an improbable and rather 
unseemly manipulation so as to achieve a proper mix of religions and 
non-religious ideologies.  Finally, even if the counterfactual does not 
automatically favor Christianity—and there is a good argument that it 
does not, but that it is rather only open to certain liberal versions of 
many religions, such as liberal Protestantism, Reform Judaism, etc.—it 
would require suppression of a large number of religious ideologies that 
happen to be firmly embedded in the daily lives of most contemporary 
constitutional democracies. 
Leaving aside whether the above counterfactual construct provides 
an useful ideal model in spite of its many shortcomings, it is now time 
to focus on how various polities have handled the constitutional 
relationship between secularism and religion.  As we shall see, the 
historical record is so much at odds with the counterfactual construct 
that, at best, the latter may provide useful critical insights, rather than 
any plausible leads for purposes of perfectibility. 
 
III.     THE CONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
SECULARISM AND RELIGION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
 
To provide even a cursory overview of the current constitutional 
landscape, it is necessary to address briefly the following three subjects: 
First, to provide a description of the principal existing models of 
constitutional regulation of the relationship between secularism and 
religion; second, to compare the functioning of these models in terms of 
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the constitutional jurisprudences that they have respectively generated; 
and third, to account for important recent historical developments—
such as  the vast increase in religious pluralism or the large scale 
Muslim immigration to Western Europe—that pose vexing challenges 
to prevailing constitutional arrangements. 
 
A.     The Constitutional Models 
 
Under current constitutional practice, there are essentially five 
different models for managing the relationship between the state and 
religion.  These are: 1) the militant secularist model bent on keeping 
religion completely out of the public sphere (e.g., French and Turkish 
“laicité”); 2) the agnostic secularist model that seeks to maintain a 
neutral stance among religions but does not shy away from favoring 
religion over atheism and other non-religious perspectives (e.g., this is 
close to current American constitutional jurisprudence); 3) the 
confessional secular model, which incorporates elements of the polity’s 
mainstream majority religion, primarily for identitarian purposes, and 
projects them as part of the polity’s constitutional secularism rather than 
as inextricably linked to the country’s main religion (e.g., Italy’s or 
Bavaria’s adoption of the crucifix as a secular symbol of national 
identity); 4) the official religion with institutionalized tolerance for 
minority religions model (e.g., the United Kingdom, Scandinavian 
countries, Greece); and 5) the millet based model, in which high priority 
is given to collective self-government by each religious community 
within the polity (e.g., Israel). 
There are significant variants in relation to each of these models.  
For example, although both fall within model 1, French laïcité differs 
from its Turkish counterpart.  Indeed, in France, laïcité was adopted in a 
social and political setting that was already significantly secularized,36 
whereas in Turkey, it was imposed by Kemal Attaturk to trigger a shift 
towards modernism and secularism in a polity where religion was 
overwhelmingly predominant.37  As a consequence, as evinced by two 
countries’ bans on the Islamic headscarves, French laïcité is directed 
against minority religions while remaining in synchrony with the culture 
emanating from the majority religion (and those minority religions that 
are compatible with that culture), whereas Turkish laïcité is squarely 
turned against the country’s dominant majority religion.38  Moreover, 
 
 36 See Michel Troper, Sovereignty and Laïcité, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2561 (2009). 
 37 See Murat Borovali, Islamic Headscarves and Slippery Slopes, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2593 
(2009). 
 38 See Susanna Mancini, The Power of Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and 
Religion as Guarantors of Cultural Convergence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2629, 2660 (2009). 
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there is disagreement within the United States, where model 2 is in 
operation, whether secularism requires a full “wall of separation” 
between the state and religion, or whether the state can prefer religion 
over non-religion so long as it does not single out any religion for 
preferential treatment.39  There can also be significant variants within 
model 3, the confessional secular model, depending, among other 
things, on whether the polity at stake has one dominant religion, as in 
the case in Italy, or whether it has more than one traditionally implanted 
religion, as is the case in Germany, where Catholicism is predominant 
in some regions and Protestantism in others.  In the context of a single 
dominant religion, model 3 seems, in substance, quite close to model 4, 
which is itself open to a wide range of variants.  Indeed, some 
established religions, such as the Church of England, seem to have little 
more than a ceremonial presence on the public sphere and may impinge 
on secularism less than some versions of the separatist approach under 
model 2.40  By contrast, in other cases, such as that of Greece, the 
established religion can have a much more dominant role, tending to 
relegate minority religions close to the status of being merely tolerated.  
Finally, there are also many conceivable variants in connection with 
model 5.  For instance, currently in Israel, recognized religious 
communities have a monopoly over marriage and divorce with respect 
to those whom they deem to be members of their community.41  One 
could conceive, and there is much discussion about this in Israel,42 of a 
millet system in which a secular civil libertarian alternative is available 
for those who wish to opt out from the religious community to which 
they belong. 
Even before broaching the constitutional jurisprudence that 
emerges from these various models, it is quite obvious that all of them 
are beset by serious shortcomings.  Not only do all these models 
completely fail the ideal of areligious secularism, but they also frustrate 
the aims of the religious, or of the non-religious, or of minority 
religions, or, in some cases, the aims of all three.  Model 1 purports to 
be neutral toward religion, but the militant brand of secularism 
promoted by French and Turkish laïcité often seem downright hostile to 
religion.  Model 2 may well put the non-religious at a disadvantage, and 
may also, in spite of its professed neutrality among religions, privilege 
mainstream religion as against “strong” or minority religions.43  Model 
3 seems particularly problematic, as confessional secularism is likely to 
be found wanting by most, if not all, confessions within the polity and 
 
 39 See Greenawalt, supra note 27. 
 40 See Kent Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 2386-87. 
 41 See Sapir & Statman, supra note 34, at 2868-71. 
 42 See id. at 2873-78. 
 43 See Rosenfeld, supra note 11, at 59. 
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by all those who are genuinely committed towards secularism.  Indeed, 
“confessionalized” secularism is likely to offend both the very religious 
who would consider their deeply-held religious convictions trivialized, 
and the committed secularists who would feel their position being 
undermined through saturation of the public space with religious 
symbols and practices relabeled as secular.44  In addition, Model 3 and 
Model 4 are bound to disfavor minority religions, thus altogether 
foreclosing the equal treatment all religions within the polity.  Finally, 
Model 5, based on the millet system, is prone not only to disadvantaging 
secularism as already mentioned, but also to unduly privileging the 
group over the individual, as well as recognized religions and certain 
denominations within the latter (e.g., in Israel, Orthodox Judaism to the 
exclusion of Conservative or Reform Judaism). 
 
B.     Lessons from Constitutional Jurisprudences 
 
An overview of the constitutional jurisprudences concerning the 
treatment of religion—and the contributions to this Symposium provide 
a rich and varied sampling touching on most of  the key issues—reveals 
how fragile and malleable secularism is as a constitutional concept; how 
difficult it is for minority religions within a polity to secure adequate 
protection, let alone being treated as equals; how intractable clashes of 
ideology among religions, and between religions and non-religious 
ideologies, have tended to be; how elusive the search for a proper 
balance between constitutional rights pertaining to religion and other 
fundamental rights have proven to be; and how the rhetoric used in the 
battles over the constitutional treatment of religion has been stretched to 
the point that key doctrinal distinctions become almost completely 
blurred.  As all these issues are treated in depth in the contributions to 
this Symposium, I will only deal with them in the broadest terms to 
highlight the most salient problems and challenges that they raise. 
The fragility of secularism can be boiled down to the following 
three problems it inevitably confronts: Secularism is not what it appears 
to be; it is too much for some; and, at the same time, too little for others.  
In other words, not only is secularism in practice never areligious as it 
ought to be in theory, but because of its origins, functioning, and the 
environments in which it is deployed, it can never approximate the 
areligious ideal, even under the best of possible (as opposed to 
counterfactual) circumstances.  Moreover, secularism has never 
achieved stability, as it has been in a constant tug of war between those 
who consider it to impinge too much on religion and those who deem it 
 
 44 See id.; Mancini, supra note 38, at 2634-35. 
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an insufficient shield against unwarranted encroachments of religion.  
The former tend to be the religious and the latter the non-religious, 
atheist or agnostic—but that need not to be the case, as secularism can 
become a sword or a shield used by one religion against another.  It is 
obvious that if a dominant religion utilizes too much of the public space 
to the detriment of other religions, then the latter might find it useful to 
invoke secularism to prevent further encroachments or to regain lost 
ground.  Perhaps less obvious, but also possible, is for secularism to be 
used by a majority religion to fend off a minority one, as is arguably the 
case in France to the extent that laïcité is largely compatible with 
Catholicism and is being used against Islam.45 
The fragility of secularism is perhaps best illustrated by its 
trajectory in France.  French laïcité appears to have the best claim for 
coming closest to areligious secularism and of coming short, if at all, on 
the side of anti-religious secularism.  Yet, as Michel Troper’s 
conceptual history of the term vividly brings to light, laïcité was the 
product of a particular accommodation between the French Catholic 
Church and the state.46  To be sure, the deployment of laïcité in France 
required some restraints on religion, thus somewhat relativizing 
Catholicism within the polity.  But at the same time, laïcité was molded 
in theory and practice so as to render the public space as compatible as 
possible with the culture associated with Catholicism, if not with the 
religion itself.  This phenomenon is succinctly captured in the French 
popular term “Catho-laïque” used often to refer to a Catholicism that 
has adapted to laïcité, but that also connotes the corollary of a laïcité 
that has been fitted for harmonious co-existence with Catholicism. 
Even under ideal conditions, for secularism to achieve meaningful 
neutrality, i.e., to be genuinely areligious, the public sphere must be 
shrunk to a minimum, becoming almost exclusively the locus for 
discussions on how best to achieve objectives over which there is 
unanimous consensus throughout the polity.  The ideal neutral secular 
public square must thus, in effect be, a “naked public square.”47  As 
Karl-Heinz Ladeur emphasizes in his account of German secularism, 
however, a naked public square is an unlivable environment, with the 
consequence that the push for secularism prompts a return of the 
repressed, which takes the form of a hybrid between religion and 
culture.48  What this means is that secularism unleashes a process 
 
 45 See Mancini, supra note 38, at 2664 (discussing France’s policy on the Islamic veil as at 
once both a reinforcement of France’s Catholic heritage and an attack against Islam). 
 46 See Troper, supra note 36, at 2568-69. 
 47 See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA (1984) (providing a critique of the aim of instituting a complete secularized public 
sphere in the U.S.). 
 48 See Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The Myth of the Neutral State and the Individualization of 
Religion: The Relationship Between State and Religion in the Face of Fundamentalism, 30 
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whereby the majority or mainstream religion—or, in the case of 
Catholic and Protestant Germany, religions—becomes accultured while, 
by the same token, the culture in question incorporates or consolidates 
the symbols and ways of the world of the religion(s) in question.  In 
Germany, this process is more open than in France, as religion is taught 
as part of the polity’s culture in public schools and the state and religion 
are in other significant ways entangled notwithstanding the country’s 
constitutional commitment to secularism.49  In both France and 
Germany, however, mainstream religion becomes steeped in a culture of 
secularism, and secularism becomes a viable culture through 
incorporation and adaptation of elements drawn from mainstream 
religion.  It is, therefore, not surprising that Islam should pose vexing 
problems in those countries, as it neither fits the mainstream religions 
nor the cultures with which they have become intertwined.50 
Once one understands the seemingly inescapable alliance between 
majority or mainstream religion and the particular culture of secularism 
prevalent in a given polity, it becomes quite clear why minority 
religions tend to fare poorly in secular constitutional democracies.  The 
various Symposium contributions dealing with the problems raised by 
the Islamic veil in Western Europe amply attest to that.51  Moreover, it 
is not only against Islam, and not only in Europe, and secularism has 
proven discriminatory against non-mainstream religion.  For example, 
in the United States, Mormons were refused exemptions from criminal 
laws against polygamy,52 and adherents to a Native American religion 
were refused exemptions from criminal drug laws that prohibited the 
sacramental use of peyote.53  In contrast, Catholics and Jews were 
granted exemptions for ritual use of wine at the time that the 
constitutional prohibition against the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages was in place.54 
 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2445 (2009). 
 49 See Matthias Mahlmann, Freedom and Faith—Foundations of Freedom of Religion, 30 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2473 (2009). 
 50 Some minority religions can be integrated within the mainstream over time by becoming 
more open to the polity’s culture and by in turn making inroads into that culture in the course of a 
two-way dynamic.  Thus, Jews who figured as the “other” in nineteenth century Europe have now 
joined mainstream religions and been replaced as the “other” by Muslims.  See Maleiha Malik, 
Comment, Muslims Are Now Getting the Same Treatment Jews Had a Century Ago, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 2, 2007, at 35. 
 51 But see Patrick Weil, supra note 21 (arguing that everyone, including Muslims, ended up 
better off in France as a consequence of the 2004 law banning the Islamic veil in French public 
schools). 
 52 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 53 See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 54 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 727 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  Prohibition was instituted by adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution in 1919 and was repealed by the Twenty First Amendment in 1933. 
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As often alluded to in the preceding discussion,55 ideological 
clashes among religions, and among religions and secularism, abound.  
Whether those clashes center around the teaching of evolution theory in 
public schools, the display of the crucifix, the wearing of the Islamic 
veil, stem cell research, abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriage, 
polygamy or blasphemy, there seem to be no solutions acceptable to all 
parties involved.  Moreover, though some of the above-mentioned 
clashes may be definitively resolved pursuant to a counterfactual ideal 
of secularism, actual versions of secularism vary so significantly, and 
intertwine respectively with such diverse arrays of religious cultures, 
that agreement even exclusively among secularists often seems 
impossible to achieve.  Furthermore, these kinds of ideological clashes 
abound, even within the confines of individual religions.  To cite but 
one example, interpretations of Islam differ as to whether Muslims in a 
country in which they constitute a minority ought or ought not interact 
with secular institutions in the public sphere or with adherents to other 
Abrahamic religions.56  In sum, all of these profound and divisive 
ideological clashes seem ultimately intractable.  Most of these must 
eventually be resolved within the ambit of the relevant constitutional 
jurisprudence.  But that often fuels more bitter debate within the polity 
involved rather than lowering the passions or taking the issue, at least 
temporarily, off the table.57 
Constitutional rights pertaining to religion often clash with other 
fundamental rights afforded constitutional protection.  The most 
notorious conflicts are those that pit freedom of religion against the 
rights of woman,58 and against the free speech rights.59  As Dieter 
Grimm makes clear, doctrinal means have been, and can be, devised to 
handle the full gamut of constitutional claims relating to religion, 
including conflicts with other rights.60  Constitutional adjudication of 
these latter conflicts seem best handled through application of the 
standard of proportionality and through judicial balancing commonly 
employed to resolve conflicts among constitutional rights generally.61 
Application of the proportionality standard to conflicts of rights 
involving religion is problematic, however, in ways that are generally 
not at issue when religion is not at stake.  For example, in a conflict 
 
 55 See supra passim. 
 56 See March, supra note 31. 
 57 A prime example of this was the aftermath of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF 
ABSOLUTES (1990). 
 58 See Frances Raday, Secular Constitutionalism Vindicated, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2769 
(2009). 
 59 See Haarscher, supra note 20, at 2802-10. 
 60 Dieter Grimm, Conflicts Between General Laws and Religious Norms, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2369 (2009). 
 61 Id. 
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between free speech rights and privacy rights, there is generally a 
background consensus that includes all the parties to the controversy as 
well as the adjudicator.  They all share the premises that impart validity 
on the secular constitutional order in place and on the particular rights 
involved in the dispute.  They all agree on the importance of free speech 
and privacy, but disagree on where to draw the line between them when 
they happen to be in conflict.  When religion rights are at issue, in 
contrast, often the background consensus referred to above breaks 
down, with the freedom of religion claimant challenging the very 
premises of the secular constitutional order itself. 
In a dispute where religion is not involved, proportionality analysis 
should legitimately assess all claims from the same perspective.  But 
should the same principle apply when a religious claim is at issue?  Or 
should such claims also be considered from the internal perspective of 
the religion involved?  Or else, only evaluated from the secular 
perspective incorporated in the constitutional order?62  This problem is 
compounded when the religion involved itself has a conception of the 
right that is being invoked against it.  Thus, for example, as the various 
claims made in relation to the dispute over the Islamic veil amply 
illustrate, those arguing from within a religious tradition often oppose 
their religion’s perspective on women’s equality or dignity as against 
that advanced by liberal constitutionalism.63  Is the woman who asserts 
that she is voluntarily wearing the veil a victim of gender-based 
equality?  Or does the ban she confronts constitute an affront to her 
dignity and gender-based bias in as much as it assumes that she is not 
able to decide or fend for herself? 
One further problem contributing to the difficulties posed by 
claims relating to religion derives from rhetorical shifts that make it 
much tougher to get a proper handle on the constitutional issues actually 
at stake, and an adequate gauge of the weight of the competing interests 
in play.  Salient examples of these rhetorical shifts include the 
appropriation by proponents of religious worldviews of the rhetoric of 
free speech rights or anti-discrimination rights to bolster their freedom 
of religion objectives.64  Free speech rhetoric has been invoked by 
religious group to argue for the teaching of creationism and intelligent 
design alongside evolution theory in state schools.  Use of this rhetoric 
 
 62 This last question is only limited to the issue of ascribing a proper weight to the religion-
based claim, and not to adjudication, proportionality or the constitutional order itself.  In other 
words, the judges must operate from within the secular constitutional order, but arguably, at least, 
ought to consider the importance and weight of the religion-based claim from the internal 
religious perspective from which that claim emanates. 
 63 See Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European 
Answer, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2669 (2009) (discussing the European Court of Human Right’s 
failures in using proportionality analysis and balancing in various cases on the Islamic veil). 
 64 See Haarscher, supra note 20, at 2802-10. 
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seeks to displace the nature and import of the actual claim being made.  
When donned in free speech garb, the claim being advanced no longer 
looms primarily as setting a confrontation between religious truth and 
secular truth.  Instead, it suggests that the state is curtailing the free 
marketplace of ideas by systematically censoring discussion of certain 
views shared by many within the polity from public fora in which the 
subject matter upon which these views purport to bear is widely 
discussed. 
In other instances, religious groups have employed the rhetoric of 
constitutional equality and dignity rights in efforts to curb the free 
speech rights of those who they perceive as their religion’s enemies.  In 
this connection, critiques of Islam as a religion in a Western European 
country in which Muslims are a relatively small minority can be cast as 
being “racist,” as amounting to an affront against the “identity” of the 
Muslim minority, and of “insulting” the latter because of its relation.  In 
this way, critiques of religion, which traditionally played a key role in 
the implantation of Enlightenment-based secularism,65 are transformed 
into group defamation based on religious affiliation. 
Shifts in rhetoric can also be used by secularists or proponents of a 
majority religion against a religious minority to curtail the latter’s 
religious freedom.  By equating religion with beliefs rather than deeds, 
one can convey that certain actions or practices prescribed by a religion 
are not at their core “religious” in nature.  If polygamy for the Mormons 
at the time of Reynolds,66 or the use of peyote for Native American 
religion involved in Smith,67 are regarded as separable from core 
religious beliefs, they can certainly be ascribed relatively little weight 
when balanced against societal interests with which they are in conflict.  
If, on the contrary, the practices are presented as seamlessly intertwined 
with religious beliefs and as central within the perspective of the 
religion to which they are linked, then they would immediately seem to 
warrant being given much greater weight, even if in the end they might 
still be outweighed by pressing societal concerns. 
Some of the problems discussed above have long beset 
constitutional jurisprudences, while others have emerged or been 
aggravated due to significant changes of relatively recent vintage.  A 
brief review of the most important among these is now warranted in 
order to place both the past and the future of the constitutional treatment 
of religion in its proper context. 
 
 65 See ROUSSEAU AND L’INFÂME: RELIGION, TOLERATION, AND FANATICISM IN THE AGE OF 
ENLIGHTENMENT 9 (Ourida Mostefai & John T. Scott eds., 2009) (characterizing Voltaire’s 
famous battle cry, “Écrasez L’Infâme!,” directed against the Catholic Church, as the “motto of the 
French Enlightenment”). 
 66 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 67 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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C.     Recent Historical Changes and New Trends 
 
Many changes, that may have originated earlier but that have 
greatly accelerated or become more fully visible since the 1980’s, have 
converged to render the contemporary problems surrounding the 
relationship among constitutionalism, secularism and religion seemingly 
ever more acute.  As already mentioned, the 1980’s saw a 
deprivatization of religion in various parts of the world.68  In addition, 
by the end of the decade, the world became witness to the collapse of 
the Soviet Empire and shortly thereafter to the emergence of concurrent 
trends toward globalization and balkanization, which have set the stage, 
inter alia, for the emergence of global terrorism predicated on certain 
brands of fundamentalist religion.69  Moreover, the trend toward 
globalization has prompted vast migrations that have led both to 
significant increases in religious pluralism and diversity in numerous 
polities and to the arrival of sizeable religious minorities—such as 
Muslims in Western Europe—who find themselves often at profound 
odds with the secular and religious cultures of their country of 
immigration. 
The significant changes resulting from these historical events and 
trends are far too numerous and complex to be addressed here in but a 
most summary fashion.  Some of these changes and trends, or their 
direct impacts on religion, are addressed in many of the contributions 
that follow.  I will therefore limit my remarks here to some very general 
observations that will hopefully shed some further light on the 
conditions surrounding the issues and problems identified above and on 
the most promising possible avenues for successful future handlings of 
them. 
The Cold War period was dominated by the struggle between two 
superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, each committed to 
a different political ideology, respectively liberal capitalism and Marxist 
socialism.  Moreover, both of these competing ideologies were 
universalist in outlook and global in scope.  Also, and significantly, they 
were both consistently committed to pursuit of the Enlightenment 
project—though to be sure each in its own separate way.70 
 
 68 See supra 2334-35. 
 69 For more detailed discussion of these developments, see Rosenfeld, supra note 8, at 825-
829. 
 70 Id. at 826: 
[B]oth liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism rely on rationality and are committed to 
promoting liberty and equality for all.  The main difference between them is that they 
disagree sharply over what rationality, liberty and equality entail, and that explains 
why they were in conflict.  Nevertheless, the Cold War ideological divide is one that 
remains by and large within the confines of Enlightenment norms and values. 
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These two ideologies were sharply at odds over religion.  Soviet 
Marxism prompted atheism, whereas American liberal capitalism was 
open to, and encouraging towards, religion.71  Liberal capitalism is 
neither inherently religious nor irreligious, but the United States used its 
favorable views towards religion and its strong protection of religious 
freedom as a weapon against the Soviet Union.72  This created a bond 
between the secular and the religious in America, the secular enlisting 
religion as an ally in the Cold War, and the religious finding greater 
government support and encouragement.  But notwithstanding this 
bond, there was little danger of religion capturing the public sphere, as 
both America’s secular establishment and its religious communities 
were united in an existential and a spiritual struggle against their 
country’s Soviet antagonist. 
With the fall of the Soviet empire, the needs for the special alliance 
between secularism and religion that had been predominant in Cold War 
America all but disappeared.73  On the other hand, in post-Soviet Russia 
and East/Central Europe, there was a strong revival of religion in the 
making in newly-emancipated polities.  This revival often went hand in 
hand with a rebirth of nationalism and recourse to ethnic-based identity 
politics.  Religion and ethnic origin often combined to spur an identity 
politics bent on negating the universalist aspirations and militantly 
atheist ideology of Soviet Marxism.74  In short, whereas in the United 
States religions became emancipated from their political subordination 
during the course of the Cold War, in the area of former Soviet 
dominance religion became not only resurgent, but often inextricably 
intertwined with nationalism and ethnic identity. 
Globalization is at once the product of liberal capitalism now 
unhindered by Soviet-led socialism and the heir to the universalist 
 
 71 See Greenawalt, supra note 27, at 2383-84. 
 72 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the words “under God” were added to the U.S. Pledge 
of Allegiance, changing the phrase “one nation indivisible” to “one nation indivisible under God” 
in 1954 during the Eisenhower Administration, sixty two years after the Pledge was originally 
written.  See Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he words ‘under 
God’ were intended to recognize a “Supreme Being,” at a time when the government was 
publicly inveighing against atheistic Communism.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 73 Although the alliance in question was predominant during the Cold War, it was not conflict 
was averted, as the contested jurisprudence regarding the Religion Clauses attests.  See 
Greenawalt, supra note 27; Haarscher, supra note 20.  Moreover, the “deprivatization” of religion 
promoted by Protestant fundamentalists in the U.S. was already manifest several years before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.  See CASANOVA, supra note 7, at 3.  Nevertheless, the thrust of the present 
account is not affected by the developments.  Indeed, by the 1980’s, tensions with the Soviet 
Union under Gorbachov had already considerably lessened, thus affording more room to 
maneuver both to the religious and to the secular. 
 74 One of the most salient examples of this amalgam of religion and ethnicity in politics is 
that of Bosnia, a multiethnic republic that had been a part of former Yugoslavia and that became 
tragically mired in a bloody civil war among ethnic Serbs belonging to Orthodox Christianity, 
ethnic Croats who were Catholic, and Bosniaks who were Muslims. 
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aspirations formally shared by liberal capitalism and Soviet Marxism.  
Globalization unhinges traditional poles of identity through its push for 
homogeneous worldwide markets, and thus promotes a further 
reinforcement of balkanization and identity politics.  Balkanization is 
accordingly overdetermined: on the one hand, it is a reaction against the 
Soviet repression of religion and identity politics, and on the other hand, 
it constitutes a defense mechanism against the unwanted intrusions of 
ever-expanding global markets.  To the extent that it accelerates the 
“disenchantment” of reason as noted already,75 moreover, globalization 
itself propels a religious revival without a need for coupling it with 
balkanization.  Thus, religion alone, as tends to be the case in the United 
States, or religion glued to ethnic identity, as is the case in balkanized 
polities, finds new ways to challenge secularism and liberal ideology. 
Globalization also accelerates migration, as global capitalism calls 
for global labor.  Such migration usually renders the host country more 
multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and religiously diverse.  As indicated in the 
course of elaborating the counterfactual construct in Part II above, 
approximating areligious secularism becomes less and less likely as the 
number of religions in a polity proliferates.76  Also, the more alien the 
religion and religious culture of the immigrants to a polity turn out to 
be, the more problems they are likely to encounter.  These problems, in 
turn, are unlikely to become solved so long as the new religion does not 
share a common culture with the already-established religions within 
the polity, or with the brand of secularism associated with the latter. 
Finally, historical change going much farther back, the advent of 
the welfare state, when combined the deprivatization of religion, 
progressively undermines the traditional divide between the public 
sphere and the private sphere to the point of vitiating most of its use in 
the context of present-day relationships between religion and the state.  
On the one hand, the state has become much more omnipresent 
throughout the contemporary polity.  The contemporary state typically 
provides public education, public health, public funding for medical 
research, and the apportionment of public benefits, including individual 
and family welfare and pension benefits, to cite but some of the most 
obvious examples.  At the same time, the contemporary state tends to 
reach deeper and deeper into what traditionally were deemed purely 
private relationships.  Among other things, private employment 
relationships, as well as most market-based transactions among private 
parties, and even the most intimate aspects of private family life, such 
as the relation between spouses and between parents and children (at 
least when abuse and neglect within the home are at issue) are all, for 
the most part, subject to state regulation and active intervention. 
 
 75 See supra p. 2335. 
 76 See supra p. 2344-45. 
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On the other hand, deprivatized religion tends to increasingly spill 
over into the public sphere. This is perhaps most obvious under the 
millet system, where religion monopolizes the regulation of marriage 
and divorce, but is also quite present in other contexts.  For example, 
religious institutions are quite active in many polities that are in 
principle secular in public sphere battles over abortion, euthanasia, 
stem-cell research, same-sex marriage and multiple other issues of 
particular interest to religion.  Moreover, what is most remarkable in 
this respect is not so much that they seek to promote and protect the 
interests of their own religious community with in the public arena.  It is 
rather that they seek to subject the entire population of the polity to 
normative constraints emanating from their own religious tradition, but 
not shared by many other religious and secular members of the polity.  
To cite but one obvious example, the Catholic Church has often 
intervened in the public arena to promote a complete ban on abortion, 
even though abortion may be permissible from the standpoint of certain 
other religions and from that of the non-religious within the polity.  In 
view of these concurrent trends of greater state intervention in the 
private sphere combined with the greater active role of religion in the 
public sphere, one wonders if it still makes sense to center constitutional 
relationships between secularism, religion and the state along the divide 
between the public and the private spheres. 
 
IV.     BEYOND THE PRESENT PREDICAMENT: CAN AND SHOULD THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT BE SALVAGED? 
 
It seems clear from the preceding discussion that it would be 
mostly unproductive to seek ever greater approximation of the ideal 
counterfactual construct elaborated in Part II above.  Does that mean 
that the Enlightenment project must be completely abandoned when it 
comes to the constitutional treatment of religion?  And even assuming 
that it need not, should it be abandoned? 
The four essentials identified in connection with the ideal 
counterfactual cannot come close to realization, relegating the 
counterfactual to an instrument of critique rather than a standard of 
perfectability.  Specifically: First, the strict divide between Reason and 
Faith it prescribes seems much too far removed from a world in which 
secularism and religion are as often allied as they are at odds, and in 
which non-religious ideologies cannot be categorically distinguished 
from religious ones, particularly as a result of the inroads of post-
modernism and of deprivatized and de-relativized religion.  Second, not 
only has secularism actually failed to be areligious in its impact, but it 
has proven religious or imbued with religious culture or with anti-
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religious elements in its content.  Third, the goal to maintain a workable 
divide between the public and the private sphere is becoming ever more 
elusive.  And, fourth, as religions and non-religious ideologies multiply 
within the polity, and particularly when foreign ideologies steeped in 
alien cultures achieve a sizeable visible presence in a country of 
immigration with largely incompatible religious and cultural traditions, 
the prospect of substantive equal treatment for all the competing 
conceptions of the good found within the polity seems close to nil. 
This does not mean that the Enlightenment project has necessarily 
become futile, but it does require that it be transformed and reoriented.  
The divide between Reason and Faith need not be abandoned, but it 
must be conceived as much more fluid and uncertain, and it must be 
redeployed to address current threats to core Enlightenment values as 
opposed to those of the past.  In the Eighteenth Century, it was 
organized religion that was the Enlightenment’s fiercest adversary; 
today, it is fundamentalist and strong religions, with more moderate and 
more liberal religions often barely, if at all, at odds with scientific 
reason.  One possibility, therefore, is to switch to a situational and 
relational approach.  Taken together, the two contributions to the 
Symposium that focus on public reason hint at what such a shift might 
encompass.  Kent Greenawalt presents a nuanced and open-ended 
picture of the workings of public reason in harmony with the political 
and constitutional treatment of religion in the United States.77  András 
Sajó, on the other hand, considers public reason from the standpoint of 
the inroads of, and threats posed by, religious fundamentalism and 
strong religion.  In that context, he argues for reliance on a strongly and 
clearly demarcated conception of public reason.78 
The distinction between the public and the private sphere may no 
longer be useful for present purposes, but it might be fruitfully replaced 
by reliance on the contrast between intra-communal and inter-
communal relationships.  Broadly speaking, all those who share the 
same religious ideology79 can be said to belong to a single religious 
community.  Consistent with this, moreover, dealings within a single 
religious community are “intra-communal,” whereas those involving 
two or more religious communities, or a religious and a secular 
community, or those that purport to transcend the bounds of all relevant 
religious communities, are “inter-communal.”80  Finally, the distinction 
 
 77 See Greenawalt, supra note 27. 
 78 See Sajó, supra note 6. 
 79 I emphasize “religious ideology” rather than “religion” in order to allow for the 
characterization of different sects or denominations to be treated as different communities, and 
for the dealings of a dissident member of a religion with his or her co-religionists to be deemed to 
be inter-communal if the context warrants. 
 80 Although the intra-communal sphere may overlap, and on occasion even completely 
coincide, with the private sphere, and likewise, the inter-communal sphere with the public sphere, 
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between intra-communal and inter-communal as used here is not meant 
to be understood in an essentialist sense, but rather in a functional and 
contextual one.  Thus, to the extent that an interdenominational group 
joins forces to combat an external threat, the dealings among the 
members of the various denominations involved are properly considered 
intra-communal.  But, by the same token, other areas of interaction 
between the same actors where they are divided along denominational 
lines would properly considered inter-communal. 
Based on this contrast, inter-communal dealings should be 
subjected to greater restrictions in the name of reason, as broadly 
redefined and incorporated in the polity’s conception of secularism and 
in the name of a conception of liberty and equality that seeks fairness 
among the perspectives represented in the particular inter-communal 
setting involved.  Genuinely intra-communal dealings—i.e., those in 
which no one within the group feels so alienated as to be prompted to 
adopt what would amount to an inter-communal position vis-à-vis 
fellow members within the group—on the other hand, would be much 
less restricted, being by and large left alone so long as they do not pose 
any significant risk of interference with, or harm to, inter-communal 
dealings or the intra-communal dealings of other groups within the 
polity. 
This approach would lessen the danger of veering too far in the 
direction of the naked public square, and make more room for a richer 
communal life among the diverse communities within the polity, 
consistent with the views advanced in Adam Seligman’s contribution.81  
In spite of the advantages it presents, however, this approach would by 
no means afford satisfactory solutions to all the problems associated 
with the interface between constitutionalism, secularism and religion.  
Even in a polity reconstituted institutionally in terms of the dynamic 
between inter-communal and intra-communal dealings, the various 
religious and non-religious communities involved could plausibly 
remain internally closed and externally hostile, creating an atmosphere 
more akin to hardening Balkanization than harmonious cooperation and 
coexistence under the aegis of a common constitutional culture. 
In spite of this danger, the fluidity of the relational approach 
afforded by the dynamic between intra-communal and inter-communal 
dealings, and the concurrent move away from certain rigid categorical 
distinctions of the past embodied in the counterfactual construct 
 
the intra-communal/inter-communal distinction is by no means coextensive with that between 
private and public.  For example, under the millet system, each religious community is supposed 
to govern itself in internal matters, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc., with its own legal 
system and courts.  See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 156 (1995).  
Accordingly, in the context of the millet system, many matters not confined within the private 
sphere remain nonetheless purely intra-communal. 
 81 See Adam B. Seligman, Living Together Differently, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2881 (2009). 
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considered above, should encompass, and perhaps even prompt, greater 
openness and accommodation both within, and among, groups within 
the polity.  Religions are not monolithic and are often susceptible of 
gradual adaptation to changed circumstances.  This is clearly illustrated 
in Andrew March’s recounting of the different ways in which Islam has 
dealt with its status as a minority religion in polities dominated by 
secularism and other religions.82  These range from virtually total 
inward withdrawal to significant cooperation with secular groups or 
with other monotheist religions within the polity.83  By the same token, 
the non-religious can also adapt to some extent to the ways of the 
religious without compromising their own ideological commitments, as 
illustrated by Gidi Sapir and Daniel Statman.84 
The attractiveness of framing relationships in terms of the 
distinction between the intra-communal and the inter-communal is 
enhanced given that the citizen of a typical contemporary constitutional 
democracy is bound to become immersed in a number of different 
communities at once and to have to negotiate conflicts and tensions that 
arise as a result.  A German speaking Swiss Catholic feminist woman, 
for example, belongs to the Swiss nation, to one of its four main 
linguistic groups, to one of its two dominant religions, and to one socio-
political group with particular aims and views regarding women’s 
equality and gender-based relationships.  Depending on the 
circumstances, the woman in question may focus more on her national 
identity than her linguistic group identity, or vice versa.  On some 
occasions, her Catholicism may be in tension or conflict with her 
feminism.  Because of that, she may decide to live with a certain 
amount of dissonance and inconsistency, or seek reform from within—
e.g., working to achieve changes within the Catholic Church leading to 
the eventual anointment of women priests—or, feeling alienated from 
the Church, become a dissident who nonetheless wishes to remain 
within her religious community, or also, conceivably, feel that her 
commitments to her fellow Catholics and those to her fellow feminists 
are so incompatible that she must withdraw from one of these two 
communities. 
What is crucial for our purposes is that this single individual must 
constantly shift from intra-communal to inter-communal perspectives in 
the management of her multiple allegiances; that she cannot avoid 
bringing some of the values she shares with her fellows in one 
community, e.g., feminist values, into her intra-communal dealings in 
another community, e.g., her Catholic religious community; and that 
short of experiencing such a strong sense of incompatibility as would 
 
 82 See March, supra note 31. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See Sapir & Statman, supra note 34, at 2870-72. 
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prompt her to quit a group with whom she had strongly identified, she 
would strive to find ways to juggle her many loyalties and to live with 
tensions and inconsistencies bound to arise due to her multiple group 
membership.  In short, this woman’s difficulties could be mitigated 
through intermittent compartmentalization—e.g., when praying in 
church she would not focus on her frustrations as a feminist—and 
projection of intra-communal values inter-communally—e.g., bringing 
her feminist ideals to the table at meetings of her Catholic community 
group.  Moreover, these operations that take place at the individual level 
can also be carried out at the collective level by various groups within 
the polity and the polity itself as the group of the whole.  And, except in 
cases of clear incompatibility, this dynamic between intra-communal 
and inter-communal dealings should afford numerous possibilities for 
peaceful coexistence within a constitutional order among proponents of 
numerous and diverse religious and secular ideologies. 
The dynamic between intra-communal and inter-communal 
dealings can also be helpful to reconfigure secularism in light of the 
futility of pursuing a neutral areligious ideal and of the seemingly 
inevitable links between secularism and religion revealed in the course 
of retracing the history of the various actual incarnations of the 
concept.85  Functionally, secularism should promote peaceful and 
productive inter-communal relationships within the polity combined 
with guaranteeing maximum room for intra-communal autonomy 
consistent with preserving the integrity of the space needed for inter-
communal exchanges.  Substantively, on the other hand, secularism 
would draw on two distinct sources of identity.  In part, secularism 
would draw on that which makes possible and facilitates inter-
communal coordination and cooperation among religious ideologies, 
and among the latter and non-religious ones.  What would be 
encompassed within this rubric would vary from one setting to the next, 
depending on the religions, history and cultures involved.  In any case, 
incorporation of elements drawn from religion or religious culture 
would be entirely permissible.  The criterion of validity for such 
elements derived from religion would not depend on how close or 
removed they may be from religion itself, but on whether they advance 
or hinder the smooth functioning of the requisite channels of inter-
communal exchange. 
In part also, secularism would draw on another sources of identity, 
rooted in the traditional Enlightenment conception of the term.  In 
contrast to the first source of identity, which could be characterized as 
secularism’s inter-communal identity, this second source could be 
regarded as secularism’s intra-communal identity, or in other words, as 
 
 85 See supra Part III.B. 
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secularism’s conception of itself as a separate and distinct ideology.  
Indeed, in all contemporary constitutional democracies, there are certain 
citizens who are secular rather than religious, who put science ahead of 
faith, and who believe that the pursuit of liberal liberty and equality for 
all should trump any divine prescription to the contrary.  These “intra-
communal” secularists have as much a right to have a place at the inter-
communal table as do the proponents of the various religious ideologies. 
Secularism’s inter-communal identity is contextually dependent in 
that what might bring together proponents of various different 
ideologies depends on the actual ideologies involved.  Secularism’s 
intra-communal identity, in contrast, is self-contained, and one can 
easily imagine a well-functioning, self-enclosed, homogeneous, secular 
society cut off from all religion.  In actuality, however, the gap between 
these two identities is likely to prove far less stark for three principal 
reasons.  First, intra-communal secularism must figure in the 
elaboration of its inter-communal counterpart to the extent that the 
secularist ideology is present in the relevant polity.  Second, given the 
tendency to develop plural identities and multi-group memberships, 
elements of the secularist ideology are bound to slip into intra-
communal precincts of competing ideologies.  Thus, some liberal 
religions are quite compatible with commitment to liberal liberty and 
equality for all.  Moreover, some adherents of non-liberal religions may 
nonetheless embrace certain secular values and cope with the tensions 
involved through compartamentization.  And, third, by the same token, 
proponents of intra-communal secularism need not shut the door to 
religion, and may in fact embrace religion without contradiction so long 
as they adhere to the primacy of the secular outlook. 
Given its multiple functions and sources of identity, it stands to 
reason that secularism should be in constant flux and that it should be 
amenable to being used as both sword and shield.  It is instructive, in 
this connection, to consider the example of France.  As Pierre Birnbaum 
explains, Jews and Protestants took the lead in calling for the 
institutionalization of laïcité in France.86  Yet, as already mentioned, 
instutionalized French laïcité has a distinct Catholic imprint.87  One 
plausible explanation for this, consistent with the conception of 
secularism advanced here, is that acceptance of a majority religion 
imprint on secularism was the best achievable compromise for the latter, 
for the minority religions involved and for intra-communal secularists. 
One key issue that arises in connection with the reconfiguration of 
secularism outlined above regards which religious and non-religious 
ideologies to include in the inter-communal sphere, and which to 
 
 86 See Pierre Birnbaum, On the Secularization of the Public Square: Jews in France and in 
the United States, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2431 (2009). 
 87 See supra p. 2352. 
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exclude.  It is clear that not all religions and non-religious ideologies 
can be included.  A fundamentalist religion that seeks to either convert 
or kill those who do not adhere to it and a militant atheistic ideology 
that would prohibit and punish all religious manifestations would 
clearly have to be excluded from any polity that conforms to the basic 
tenets of constitutionalism.88  But beyond that, why include a religion 
that strongly opposed secularism?  Or, why include secularism in a 
setting where large majorities have a strong religious aversion to it? 
 From the standpoint of traditional Enlightenment values, 
secularism occupied a privileged place and the acceptance of religion 
was conditioned on compatibility with deployment of the secular 
project.  This made the answers to the previous questions clear.  The 
more a religion proved congruent with secularism, the more its 
admission to the secular polity was warranted.  Conversely, religions 
that would interfere with the proper functioning of secularism would 
have to be excluded or restricted.   In the context of the present 
reconfiguration of secularism, however, no such clear answers readily 
emerge.  Secularism and the constitutional order it fosters are inherently 
tolerant of diversity, but as Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar underscore, 
not of competition.89  But why prefer secularism’s tolerance over other 
kinds of tolerance or even over intolerant ideologies once one concedes 
that secularism as such is but one intra-communal ideology among 
many? 
This last query forces one to focus on the larger question raised at 
the beginning of this Part: whether the Enlightenment project is worth 
preserving at this point in time, or whether it would be preferable to 
abandon it in favor of a more suitable alternative.  And, given the recent 
inroads of post-modernism and derelativized religion as well as the 
continuing progression of the disenchantment of Reason, no readily 
available or obvious answer could be offered with confidence. 
One can advance, however, two more modest answers.  The first 
one is somewhat circular, but may nonetheless carry significant weight 
among proponents of constitutional democracy.  Constitutionalism 
requires secularism (in some form) and they both go hand in hand with 
certain core Enlightenment values.  Constitutionalism may thrive with a 
reconfigured on redeployed Enlightenment project, but it cannot survive 
the complete abandonment of the latter.  Therefore, if for no other 
reason, the Enlightenment project ought to be preserved for the sake of 
constitutionalism. 
 
 88 Whereas it is clear that the project of these two ideologies should be made illegal, it is not 
so obvious that advocacy in favor of such projects should be treated likewise.  This latter issue 
will not examined here as this is not necessary for present purposes. 
 89 See Ran Hirschl & Ayelet Shachar, The New Wall of Separation: Permitting Diversity, 
Restricting Competition, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2535 (2009). 
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The second answer is that contemporary polities are typically 
multiethnic, multicultural and religiously diverse, and that secularism, at 
least in its inter-communal dimension, provides the best means to 
preserve the peace and to maintain the good functioning of such 
pluralistic societies.  This second answer may be buttressed by either a 
lesser evil prudential argument or a more positive normative argument 
deriving from a pluralistic conception of the good.  The former 
argument is predicated on the conviction that unless a standoff among 
competing ideologies is maintained, a serious threat to the public order 
would ensue.  The latter more positive argument relies, for its part, on 
the premise that pluralism is good and worthy of pursuit because it 
multiplies and enhances every person’s opportunities for self-realization 
and self-fulfillment.  But regardless of which of these two arguments is 
invoked, reliance on secularism and core Enlightenment values seems 
indispensable.  Indeed, peace among proponents of competing 
ideologies cannot endure without a hefty measure of mutual tolerance, 
and pluralism cannot be furthered without promoting liberty of choice 
and equality among persons and among viable perspectives.90 
If, consistent with the counterfactual construct laid out in Part II, 
the traditional conception of the Enlightenment meshed better with 
liberalism, its reconfigured counterpart seems equally open to 
communitarianism and republicanism to the extent that these remain 
consistent with pluralism.91  From the standpoint of traditional 
liberalism, freedom of, and from, religion are, strictly speaking, 
prerogatives of the individual, not of the group.  Consistent with this, 
the legitimate rights of religious groups were reducible to a combination 
of the freedom of religion and freedom of association rights of their 
individual members.  From the standpoint of the reconfigured 
secularism presented here, in contrast, the legitimacy of intra-communal 
religious relationships can be grounded in communitarianism, and the 
legitimacy of the intra-communal autonomy of religious groups can be 
predicated on the ethos of republicanism.  In other words, so long as 
individuals have real choices and a certain number of basic rights within 
their group, including the right to exit, a far greater range of latitude can 
be extended legitimately to religious group solidarity and self-
government objectives.  And this, in turn, seems bound to vastly extend 
the field for, and the plausible configurations of, inter-communal 
 
 90 As already noted, perspectives that would lead to the destruction of pluralism, such as 
belligerent religious fundamentalism, cannot, of course, be tolerated.  But all those that are 
compatible with the pluralist ethos, even if inconsistent with it in their outlook, such as an 
intolerant religion that remains inward-looking and that does not interfere with inter-communal 
relationships, would be entitled to enjoy substantial intra-communal autonomy. 
 91 For an extended discussion of the place and role of liberalism, republicanism and 
communitarianism within a pluralist conception of the good, see ROSENFELD, supra note 22, at 
216-234. 
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secularism, hopefully enabling it to better accommodate a greater and 
more diverse set of religious and non-religious ideologies. 
Whereas the line between admissible and inadmissible religions or 
religious ideologies under this reconfigured conception of secularism is 
clear in theory, undoubtedly it will be, in several instances, difficult to 
draw in practice.  Leaving that aside, once a religion has been identified 
as clearly inadmissible, as would be the case for a belligerent 
fundamentalist one, then the fight against it would most effectively be 
conducted under the aegis of the precepts of liberalism.  Under such 
circumstances, not only the secular community, but also all other 
religious communities within the polity would be under existential 
threat.  The resulting struggle would be largely analogous to that 
between secularists and the organized dominant religion at the time of 
the Enlightenment.  Accordingly, if a polity is reduced to a struggle to 
death between belligerent religious fundamentalism and all other groups 
within, it might give the impression that basically nothing has changed 
since the French Revolution.  But that impression would be highly 
misleading, as the fundamentalist threat is only one among the many 
challenges that confront contemporary secularism and constitutional 
democracies. 
The contributions to this Symposium taken collectively provide a 
rich, nuanced, varied and compelling account of the principal 
contemporary issues and debates centering on the relationship between 
constitutionalism, secularism and religion.  A great diversity of subjects 
and viewpoints will be found in the pages that follow.  What the 
contributions to this Symposium make clear, however, is that traditional 
concepts and views relating to the constitutional treatment of religion 
must be rethought and reworked.  What remains much more a matter of 
debate is whether some of the key familiar concepts and approaches 
ought to be altogether set aside and replaced. 
The preceding discussion leaves one with a vexing lingering 
question.  The version of the Enlightenment project needed for the 
legitimation and operation of contemporary reconfigured secularism is 
dramatically more modest, less assertive, and less encompassing than 
that which emerged in the Age of the Enlightenment.  Is that due to the 
ravages of post-modernism and derelativized religion?  Or, is it rather 
due to the fact that much of the Enlightenment project has met with 
success and has become quietly internalized and subconsciously stored 
in the public psyche of contemporary constitutional democracies? 
